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Introduction: Theories of Foreign Direct Investment
Despite the fact that foreign direct investment and the related
phenomenon of the multinational enterprise have been studied extensively
for about a decade and a half, there does not exist at the time of the
writing of this article a unified, generally accepted theory explaining
why foreign direct investment takes place. Indeed, such a theory might
never exist. The more the problem is studied, the more it becomes clear
that there exists a multiplicity of causal factors stimulating such
investment. These underlying causes may in fact be so diverse as to
nullify the possibility that a single, neat theoretical construct can be
created. The prime purpose of this paper is to examine one hypothetical
cause, which I have dubbed "exchange of threat," in some depth. Because
the "exchange of threat" concept does not appear prominently in the
literature on foreign direct Investment, it is of some utility to examine
where and how the concept would fix into the existing body of theory
to explain such Investment.
Despite the lack of a unified theory most hypotheses aimed at
some partial explanation of foreign direct investment do have elements
in common. Virtually all such hypotheses ascribe as prime causalities
for foreign direct investment "imperfections" in world markets for goods,
services, and factors of production. Almost everyone can agree with
one noted international economist's observation that in a world characterized
2
by "perfect" competition, foreign direct Investment would not occur.
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A groundbreaking 1960 study suggested that a prime causal factor
behind foreign direct Investment by business firms is oligopoly
3
advantage. The study demonstrated that most firms engaged in
multinational activities are oligopolists, and therefore suggested that
direct foreign investment was better studied from the point of view of
Industrinl organization rather than the traditional "neoclassical" approach
to the theory of capital movements.
There is a conceptual difference between the two approaches in the
assumptions each makes about firm behavior. Under "neoclassical" thinking,
the firm, which is either a monopolist protected by insurmountable barriers
to entry or an atomistic price taker in its market, responds to variables
which are Impersonally determined by the forces of the market, and In making
its response, the firm does not alter the values of these varlableH. Under
"industrial organization" thinking, the firm, which is typically an oMRopoHst
responds to the actions, past or prospective, of other firms as well as to
the impersonal forces of the market place. Conversely, the actions of any
one firm will affect the subsequent actions of Its competitors - thus, in
making a strategic move, a firm not only responds to the previous actions
of its competitors, but also must consider the probable response of its
competitors to the move.
Under an industrial organization approach to the explanation of foreign
direct investment, three elements are prerequisite within an Industry before
such investment takes place. First, there must exist some sort of oligopoly
advantage possessed by a small number of firms which creates a ma lor barrier
to entry to the industry. Second, there must exist foreign markets in which
this advantage can be exploited. (These markets are "foreign" In the sense
that they are located within nations other than in which the oligopolists
are domiciled.) And third, there must exist some process by which the
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advantage, and hence the barriers to entry to the industry, will erode
over time. This erosion results in interactive firm behavior which in
turn leads to foreign direct investment.
In order to exploit the foreign market, the oligopolist would be
likely to choose, initially at least, to export the product rather than
to manufacture it inside the foreign market. This would be true because
the marginal cost of manufacturing the product at home and shipping it to
the foreign market would in general be less than the average cost of over-
seas m.anufacture . High barriers to entry would prevent local firms in the
foreign market from entering into the industry, and thus the exporting
firms would be able to extract an oligopoly rent from exportation as well
as from home market production. If the overseas elasticity of demand were
high and either the cost of shipping the product were high relative to total
value added or high tariffs were imposed by the importing nation, the exporting
firms might choose to establish manufacturing capacity abroad rather than to
export. This generally, however, would not be the case at the outset.
If, for some reason, the barriers to entry to the industry erode over
time, new entrants may be attracted to the industry by the oligopoly rent.
In his home market, the oligopolist may be able to thwart new entry by pricing
the product at some "stay-out" price below that which would maximize his short-
run profitability. The ability of the oligopolist to maintain the "stay-out"
price may be buttressed either by an absolute cost advantage accruing to him
by virtue of his being lower on the learning curve than potential new entrants
or by scale economies advantages. In the foreign market, however, the oligopolist
may be unable to maintain a "stay-out" price if local new entrants are able to
convince their local government to impose a protective tariff on the oligopolist's
product (or otherwise to restrict importation of the product).
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It is either in response to such a move by a foreign government or to
forestall such a move that the oligopolist makes a foreign cHrect Investment.
In doing so, the investing firm is in effect reacting to the threat of competi-
tion from new, local entrants in the foreign market, who are in turn increas-
ingly able to surmount the barriers to entry to the industry. The investing
firm, which is now a "foreign" firm operating directly in the host nation market,
faces certain disadvantages with respect to local competitors ''see footnote 2.).
If the "foreign" firm does not have some offset against these advantages, such
as an absolute cost advantage, the ability to deploy world-wide economies of
scale, or perhaps the possession of a preferred trade name, the firm may be
forced to withdraw from the host nation market altogether. The ability of the
firm to be "multinational," i.e., to operate directly in markets over which a
sovereign state governs (other than the sovereign state which governs the firm's
"home" market), is entirely dependent on its ability to retain some sort of
oligopoly advantage after initial barriers to entry have broken down.
Illustrative of an industrial organization approach to explaining foreign
direct investment is the product life cycle hypothesis. The product cycle has
been advanced primarily as an explanation of certain types direct investment
by U.S. based firms in Western Europe in the manufacturing sector during the
decades following World War II, although it has also been used to explain
certain types of U.S. direct foreign Investment in other locations and at other
8
times
.
The product cycle hypothesis posits that there came to exist In the United
States, beginning sometime around the turn of the century, a unique set of
conditions which motivated U.S. -based firms to innovate and commence production
of manufactured products which were appealing to high Income consumers or were
9labor saving. These conditions included the large size of the domestic U.S.
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market, the high per-capita income of the U.S. consumer, and a relative scarcity
of artisan labor, which, coupled, with the high wage cost of less skilled labor,
forced U.S. industrialists to develop process technology to enable them to sub-
stitute capital intensive processes for labor intensive ones. The result was
that U.S. firms were motivated to produce advanced consumer goods (creating a
derived demand for technologically advanced capital goods and intermediate
products) than were their European counterparts.
According to the product cycle concept, in many foreign markets, especially
those in Western Europe in the post-World War IT period, as per capita Income
grew there arose a demand for U.S. -type goods. To supply this demand, U.S.
firms were able to export to these markets. At the outset, U.S. firms would
possess an advantage over foreign competitors based on technology.
A product, however, undergoes a "life cycle." Initially, when the product
is new, the technology of the product is likely to be closely held, and it is
likely to be constantly changing as the product is improved. At this early stage
of the product life cycle a tremendous advantage is held by the Innovators of
the product; he understands the product and how to produce It. This advantage
poses a formidable barrier to entry and enables the Innovators to capture an
oligopoly rent on the product. Over time, however, the product is perfected
and the technology of the product becomes more widely understood. In order to
capitalize on scale economies in manufacturing the product, the manufacturer
must standardize the product, and hence he enables competitors to copy it more
easily. The diffusion of technological knowledge results In an erosion of the
barriers to entry. New entrants, possibly drawn into the market by the oligopoly
rent, are able to copy the product and to introduce into the market their own
imitations. Often, the imitators eventually bring to the market a version of
the product that is better or cheaper than the original innovator's version.

Thus, often the initial barriers to entry collapse. Eventually, as the
technology of the product becomes widely diffused, and the product itself
becomes highly standardized, widespread competition may drive the price to
competitive levels.
Under the product cycle hypothesis, it was when European firms became
able to imitate the U.S. firms by producing locally those products which the
U.S. firms have been exporting to Europe that U.S. direct foreign investment
takes place. In order to defend an established market in a Western European
country from the threat of a local competitor, the U.S. firm would establish
manufacturing facilities within that market. By becoming itself a local
manufacturer, the U.S. firm both bypasses potential problems of exportation
(such as tariffs or quotas) and simultaneously avails Itself of some of the
advantages the local producer might have (such as lower wage costs)
.
Empirical tests of the product cycle indicate that the power of the
theory is significant to explain certain types of U.S. direct investment in
Western Europe during the period 1950-1970. The life cycle cannot, however,
explain all U.S. direct investment in Europe during that period. In at least
two industries - bulk industrial chemicals and primary aluminum reduction -
U.S. firms have not generally possessed any significant technological ad-
vantage relative to European rivals, yet U.S. firms in these industries have
made sizeable direct investments in European nations. A possible explanation
of this investment is that in the years following World War II European firms
were unable to expand capacity rapidly enough to meet the growing demand for
these products in revitalized European markets and that U.S. firms were able to
capture market share more or less by default. During these post-War years, as
has been repeatedly noted, European industry was chronically short of capital,
and easier access to U.S. capital markets may have contributed to the ability
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of U.S. firms to bridge the gap between European demand and supply in the
aluminum and chemical industries.
Technology may then not have constituted the only initial advantage
possessed by U.S. firms which invested heavily in Europe in the post-War
era. One study of the food processing industry suggests that skills in
marketing (advertising and distribution) and perhaps ability to administer
a geographically dispersed organization constituted the initial advantage
of U.S. food processors who established during this era major operations in
12
Western Europe. In other industries similar skills and abilities may also
have contributed to U.S. firms' initial advantage.
The industrial organization approach to the explanation of foreign direct
investment forms one "school of thought" on the subiect. Capital market im-
perfections form the basis for another "school of thought."
Exchange rate risk arising from capital market imperfections forms the
13basis for one hypothesis. The reasoning is that holders of liquid assets
are willing to pay some sort of premium to be able to hold these assets in
one currency rather than some other. Logically, the premium would be attached
to the stronger currency. (The currency is "stronger" in the sense that the
a priori expectation is that this currency will, over time, appreciate in value
relative to the other currency.) If the premium is accurately reflected in
the interest rate differential between the two currencies, such that the
differential is equal to the sum of the premium plus the effective rate at
which the stronger currency is likely to appreciate relative to the weaker
currency, then an investor domiciled in a relatively strong currency area
will be able to borrow capital at a lower rate of interest (or issue equity
at a higher capitalization rate) than an investor domiciled in a weaker
14
currency area. Hence, it is argued that the rate at which the strong
currency investor is willing to discount an income stream is lower than
the rate at which the weak currency investor would be willing to discount

the same income stream. Thus, the value of this Income stream, in net present
value terms, is greater for the strong currency investor than for the weak
currency investor. Investment opportunities in the weak currency areas which
are unattractive to local investors (because of these investors' high discount
rate) might be attractive to foreign investors from strong currency areas, who
can capitalize the investment at a lower discount rate. Thus, investment
capital might flow from strong currency areas to weaker ones.
One problem with this line of reasoning is that in the middle to late
1960's, when the rate of U.S. direct foreign investment in Europe was at
record levels and greatly exceeded the rate of European direct foreign
investment into the United States, the dollar was "overvalued" with respect
to major European currencies. Thus, the net flow of direct foreign Investment
was from the "weak" currency area to the "strong" currency area, the opposite
of what the exchange rate risk theory would predict. It is argued, however,
that investors from weak currency areas would have an incentive to invest in
strong currency areas if interest-rate differentials fail to cover exchange
risks
.
The exchange rate risk theory cannot account for the phenomenon of
simultaneous cross investment between two currency areas. Proponents of
the exchange rate theory argue that cross Investment between two currency
areas must occur at different times, but, at least in the case of direct
investment flows between the United States and several European nations, this
can easily be shown not to be true. Exchange rate risk also does not account
for the fact that foreign direct investment is disportionately concentrated In
a relatively few industries (see Table 1). Neither the interest rate differ-
ential nor the exchange rate risk premium is industry dependent, and hence
a priori there is no reason to expect a greater propensity for firms in some
one industry to make direct foreign investment than for firms in some other Industry.
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Another hypothesis of direct foreign investment centering on capital
market imperfections centers about portfolio theory. The hypothesis Is
that national firms become multinational in order to extend to their investors
the option of holding foreign "securities" in their investment portfolios, an
option which the investors do not have without the services of an Intermediary
such as a multinational firm. By holding foreign "securities" the Investor can
hypothetically construct a portfolio which has more optimal risk/return char-
acteristics than one which contains securities of one nation only.
One test of the "portfolio" hypothesis suggests that one malor securtles
market (the New York Stock Exchange) "behaves as if it recognizes the Inter-
1 g
national composition of the activities of U.S. -based corporations."
Several questions can be raised about the "portfolio" hypothesis. First,
if the primary motivation for U.S. firms to become multinational is to diversify
away non-systemic risk, why do they not simply buy securities of established
non-U. S. corporations rather than making direct investments? Also, why do not
these U.S. firms, in making investments overseas, diversify their holdings by
industry?
Most of these hypotheses of direct foreign Investment have been advanced
primarily to explain the foreign investment of U.S. manufacturing firms, and
especially the investment of these firms in Western Europe. The simultaneous
presence of European direct Investment in the United States Is not well explained
by any of these hypotheses - In fact, they would (except perhaps the portfolio
hypothesis) disallow simultaneous cross investment between the United States and
some other currency area. The fact Is that European direct foreign investment
in the United States does occur, and both its absolute magnitude and its size
relative to U.S. direct investment In Europe have been increasing exponentially
since at least the middle 1960's, while at the same time U.S. direct investment
has continued to flow to Western Europe.
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The relative few efforts to explain European direct investment in the
United States have tended to focus on the attractiveness of the internal U.S.
market to European based firms. Sheer size of the U.S. market has been men-
tioned as one attraction as has been the opportunities for learning by operating
19
in the United States. The innovative stimuli of the U.S. market is another
20
f) I I r/Hl Ion . A conHtrndit placed on would-be European Investora has been the
ability to obtain financing on the scale necessary to set up U.S. operations,
and hence the opening up of sources of finance has been viewed as a key to
investment in the U.S. One aspect of this has been the emergence of European
corporations of size sufficient to manage and finance subsidiaries large enough
21
to compete in the U.S. market. One major study concludes in effect that no one
hypothesis or set of hypotheses can account for a significant portion of
22
European direct foreign investment in the United States.
At least two studies suggest oligopolistic behavior as a possible
causal factor behind European firms establishing manufacturing operations
23
in the United States. These studies suggest that European firms become
multinational themselves in order to compete effectively with U.S. multi-
nationals. As a part of a strategy of becoming multinational, these
European firms enter (and directly compete in) the U.S. market.
"Exchange-of- threat" is one possible rationale for a European firm
to do so. The next section explores this rationale.
"Exchange-of-Threat" Between Oligopolists of Differing Nationality
If an oligopolist of one nationality enters a foreign market, he
creates certain asymmetries both in this home market and in the foreign
market in which he is an entrant. The firm which has "gone foreign" is
exposed to risks and opportunities to which rival oligopolists in the
"home" market are not exposed. These rival oligopolists might perceive

li-
the opportunities of operating in the foreign market to be sufficiently
great so as to enable the firm which has "gone foreign" to be able to
develop some sort of advantage over them that might lead to disruption of
the equilibrium of the home market oligopoly. If so, the rivals might choose
to imitate the firm which has "gone foreign" by entering the foreign
24
market themselves.
The oligopolist who "goes foreign" creates an asymmetry in the
foreign market. In order to be able to think out the consequences of
this let us imagine a world in which there exists but two nations,
N, and N . Suppose that in each nation there exist a monopoly producer
of a product X, Firm 1 in N. and Firm 2 in N„. No international trade
in X goes on, so that Firm 1 supplies the entire market for X in N^ and
Firm 2 the entire market for X in N„. X is the only product manufactured
by Firm 1 and Firm 2.
Suppose now that Firm 1 perceives an opportunity to capture a share
of the market for X in N„ and to do so makes a direct investment in N„
to establish a subsidiary to manufacture X. In order to take customers
away from Firm 2, Firm 1 must be able to offer to customers in N2 something
that Firm 2 does not offer: a better or more specialized product, better
delivery and service, a lower price, etc. Should Firm 1 choose to compete
on the basis of price, it has a very special advantage (at the outset) over
Firm 2.
The advantage of Firm 1 lies in the asymmetry of its market position
in N„ relative to that of Firm 2. Firm 1 holds a monopoly position in
N. and a share of the market in Nj, while Firm 2 holds market share only
in N„. Because N, and N„ are independent markets between which there is no
trade, the price for X in one market is independent of the price in the other
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market. In order to gain market share in N
, Firm 1 may choose to undercut
Firm 2's prices. In doing so, Firm 1 reduces its margins on sales of X in
N2 but margins on sales of X in N^ are unaffected. Should Firm 2 choose to
meet Firm I's prices, by contrast, Firm 2 suffers a reduction in margins
on all sales of X.
Firm I's pricing advantage in N„ may be compounded by a cost
advantage. Firm I's sales of X in N^ cover all costs including overhead
costs such as costs of the central office and of research and development.
The subsidiary of Firm 1 in N„, therefore, does not necessarily have to
bear the costs of these overhead items, even though the subsidiary may
benefit from the services of the central offices or the research and
development labs. In N„, Firm 1 is therefore essentially a "marginal
25
cost" producer. Firm 2 is, of course, a "full cost" producer.
Firm 2 could react to Firm I's entry into the market for X in
N„ by attempting to price Firm 1 out of the market. If Firm 2 did so,
it would be forced cut price on all of product X sold. To meet Firm 2's
price, Firm 1 would have to cut price on only the quantity of X that
was sold in N„. Thus, while Firm 1 would incur a loss on only a fraction
of its total sales of X, Firm 2 would incur a loss on all its sales of X.
Thus, the total cost to Firm 2 of trying to price Firm 1 out Nr, would
be much greater than the cost to Firm 1 of "weathering out" the price
warfnre. (See Diagram 1.)
Meeting Firm I's competition head-on in N„ is not Firm 2*8 only
strategic option, however. Firm 2 could attempt to capture some share
of the market for X in N. - Firm I's home market. Were Firm 2 successfully
to do so, it could bring to N, the same advantage Firm 1 brings to N2:
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Diagram 1: Pricing Advantage of a Multinational Firm
Over a Firm Operating in But One Market
price
^
nQ ^O quantity
Assume that Firm 1 operates in nations N^ and N„, and that n^ of its sales
result from N^ and (l-n)7o from N». Firm 2 operates in N« only. No international
trade occurs between N, and N«. Total unit sales of both N^ and N„ is 0. At
price level P^ in both N^ and N» the total revenue of both Firm 1 and Firm 2 (s
AP BQ. If Firm 2 attempts to price Firm 1 out of N„ by lowering price to P ,
then Firm 2's revenue is equal to AP„EO, while Firm I's revenue is equal to
AP C + nQDEQ. Clearly, Firm 2 damages itself more than It damages Firm 1
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Firm 2 would now be the "marginal cost" producer of X in N. . Firm 2
could demonstrate that aggressive tactics on the part of Firm 1 in
N„ would lead to reprisal in N^ , and Firm 1 might be induced to behave
less aggressively in N-.
There are two ways that Firm 2 could supply its share of the
market of X in N^: Exportation of X to N^ to N„, and establishment
of a subsidary to manufacture X in N. . Were Firm 2 to export to N,
and were Firm 1 to possess any significant political power in its home
market, Firm 1 might be able to persuade the government of H to ImpoHe
restrictive tariffs or quotas on the importation of X into N^ . If Firm
1 possessed a patent on X in N. , it could stop the importation of X into
N, . Because Firm 1 manufactures X for N~ inside N», Firm 2 would be
able to take no similar retributive action against Firm 1. Were Firm 2
to establish a manufacturing subsidary in N^ , the subsidiary would be
immune from quick retribution such as imposition of restrictions on
imports.
If both Firms 1 and 2 were to pose a threat to each other in the
other's home market, such that Firm 2 could counter Firm I's aggressive
competition in N„ with reprisal in N, and Firm 1 could counter Firm 2*8
moves in N^ with reprisal in N„, each firm might come to the real locution
that it had the other "by the tail." Each firm might then realize that
continued aggressive price competition would be mutually destructive and
hence both would refrain from such competition.
Because the prime motive for Firm 2 to establish itself in N, is to
be able to threaten the stability of the market for X in N. in order to
improve its bargaining position relative to Firm 1 in N^, I have dubbed
Firm 2's action as "exchange-of-threat." Generally, "exchange-of-threat"
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might be defined as a foreign investment by a firm made in response to
the entry into its "home" market by a rival firm whose "home" market
is the foreign country. The foreign investment is made in order to
reduce the risk to the firm that its earnings stream in its home market
will be reduced by the rival firm. "Exchange-of-threat" necessarily
implies a cross investment between two geographically separated markets:
a firm based in one of the markets invests in the second market, and in
response, a firm based in the second market invests in the first.
A cross investment based on "exchange-of-threat" would necessarily
occur only in oligopolistic (or monopolistic) industries wherein sellers
are able to extract a rent, as it is the rent which is "threatened" by
the exchange. A priori , one would expect "exchange-of-threat" to be
effective if the elasticity of demand for the individual firm is high.
This would tend to be the case for non-differentiated products such as
bulk chemicals, primary metals, and highly standardized manufactured goods,
for which an individual firm might be able to Increase its market share
by means of price cutting.
Although "exchange-of-threat" logically makes sense under certain
circumstances, the question remains whether or not it actually can account
for any of the observed cross investment between the United States and
Europe. The general question is taken up in the following section of this
paper, while the remainder of this section is devoted to three specific
examples of cross investments behind which the public record would Indicate
that "exchange-of-threat" was a major motivating factor. The examples,
which occurred at different points in time in different industries, serve
to illustrate that "exchange-of-threat" is a valid explanation of at least
some specific cases of transnational cross investment.
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The first example is that of the entrance of the Royal Dutch/Shell
Company into the United States in 1913. The Royal Dutch/Shell Company,
in 1975 the largest induistrial enterprise in the world outside the United
States, was formed in the first decade of the 20— century when various
European oil interests merged their assets as a defensive move against
the competition of the Standard Oil Company. Standard Oil at the time
was virtually a monopolist in the production, transportation, refining,
and distribution of petroleum products in the United States. Beginning
late in the 19— century. Standard sought to expand its markets inter-
nationally. At that time, the majority of the world's petroleum was
produced in the United States, and at least one motive for Standard Oil's
international expansion was to secure foreign markets for excess U.S.
production. Royal Dutch/Shell began as a defensive alliance formed in
1902 against Standard, the major members of the alliance being The Royal
Dutch Company of the Netherlands, the Shell Transport and Trading Company
of Great Britain, and the Rothschild group of France. By 1907, Royal Dutch
and Shell formally merged, and in 1909, many of the Rothschild's petroleum
interests were bought out by Royal Dutch/Shell. In 1910, the Royal Dutch
Dutch/Shell Company produced, transported, refined, and distributed petroleum
products in both the Far East and in Europe. Its principal sources of
crude oil were Russia, Romania, and Indonesia, while major markets Included
Western Europe, Central Europe, Japan, and China. In size. Royal Dutch/Shell
was worldwide the second largest petroleum company, while Standard Oil was
the largest.
The exact situation which provoked Royal Dutch/Shell's entrance into the
United States was an effort by Standard Oil in 1910-1911 to increase market
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share in Europe and the Far East by means of price cutting. According to
the 1911 Annual Report of Royal Dutch/Shell:
"AlEtitiugh rhe ^riQ§ of erude nil Wf^u .m ilia iorreciiat.,
our great cottipetltor reduced the price oF refined prnductn
on the market. This has been still more marked \n the course
of 1911, and has strengthened us in our conviction that the
price reduction has no obiective other than to hamper us as
much as possible in the development of our business. A
curious fact, which in our opinion is characteristic of the
intentions of our competitors, is that the prices of kerosene
was reduced most and quickest in the Netherlands Indies, whilst
in Holland, where we sell no kerosene but only benzene, the
benzene prices were reduced the most."
To the chairman of Royal Dutch/Shell, H.W.A. Deterdlng, the answer
to Standard Oil was to counterattack the U.S. market:
"When our business grew to such international dimensions,
we obviously had to dig ourselves as traders on the American
soil; otherwise, we would have lost our foothold everywhere
else. Until we started trading in America, our American
competitors controlled world prices, because. .. they could
always charge up their losses in underselling us in other
countries against busines at home where they had a monopoly. "^^
In 1913, the Shell Oil Company of California and the Roxana Oil Company
were established by Royal Dutch/Shell. These were later consolidated into
the Shell Oil Company, which, was to grow into one of the world's largest
industrial enterprises in its own right.
In the decades following the entrance of Royal Dutch/Shell into the
United States, Standard Oil and its major successors following its
dissolution and Royal Dutch/Shell gradually ceased all-out competition
and increasingly perceived their interest to be in tandem. The last
major international price and market share war between these firms occurred
in 1927-1928. The war, which principally involved Royal Dutch/Shell, the
Standard Oil Company of New York (now Mobil Oil Corp), the Standard Oil
Company of New Jersey (now Exxon, Inc.), and a relatively new entrant into
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the international oil industry, Anglo-Persian, Ltd. (now British Petroleum,
Ltd
. ) > broke out in India but rapidly spread to other areas of the world.
The confrontation was financially damaging to all of the major oil concerns,
and in 1928 Deterding arranged for a meeting at Achnacarry Castle in England
to resolve the difficulties. Out of that meeting came the "As Is" agreement
which was, in effect, a cartel agreement dividing world markets among the
29
worlfl's largeHt petroleum companies. That agreement plus the "Red lAne"
Agreement of 1928, allowing Exxon and Mobil to become shareholders jointly
with Royal Dutch/Shell, British Petroleum, and the French CFP in the Turkish
Petroleum Company (and hence giving them access to Middle Eastern oil) ushered
in a new era of cooperation among the major oil companies which was to last
30
for at least several decades.
During the 1927-28 price war, Deterding used the American Shell Oil
Company to bring price warfare into the United States and in particular
to capture market share from the Standard Oil Company of New York in the
New England area. As such, the Shell subsidiary served the function that
Deterding originally intended - as a means to carry on price competition
within markets in the United States. Following the Achnacarry meeting,
however, this function never again proved to be needed, at least on a large
scale. The American Shell Oil Company, by this time had grown to
constitute a major portion of Royal Dutch/Shell's worldwide operations.
Over the following decades, the American subsidiary was to prove to be a
valuable source of cash flow for the parent, especially during the financially
hard years following World War II..
A second example of "exchange-of-threat" seems to have occurred In
31
the soap and edible fats Industry during the 1930' s. The situation
involved market share wars In the United States for detergents and vegetable
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shortenlngs between Lever Brothers (U.S.A.). the U.S. subsidiary
of British-Dutch firm Unilever, and Proctor and Gamble (P&G) of the
U.S.A. In 1930, Lever Brothers was the third largest producer of
soaps and related products in the United States, well behind P&G, the
industry leader, and second place Colgate - Palmolive - Peet. In fact,
until the late 1920' s. Lever in the United States was little more than
a regional New England producer. Beginning in 1926, however, under the
leadership of Francis Countway, Lever began aggresslvel y to enlarge its
share of the U.S. soap and detergent markets by expanding geographically
and by introducing to the market a series of heavily promoted new products.
Lever's efforts in the soap and detergent markets damaged Colgate-
Palmolive - Peet more than P&G, and in 1928 Colgate - Palmolive - Peet
attempted a countermove by establishing facilities to manufacture
"Palmolive" soap in the U.K. In the U.K., where Unilever held a nearly
monopolistic position in soap and edible fats, "Palmolive" never was
able to gain a significant market share, and the effort at "exchange-of-
threat" failed.
Perhaps emboldened by his success in the soap and detergent market
but perhaps also as a countermove to P&G's introduction to the market
of new detergents to compete with those of Lever, in 1930 Countway took
steps to break P&G's highly profitable hold on the U.S. vegetable shortening
market. Despite advice from the London office to the contrary, Countway
introduced a shortening ("Spry") to compete with the P&G brand ("Crlsco").
In what was interpreted by Unilever executives as a countermove, in 1930
32
P&C acquired a small British soap company, G. Hedley, Ltd. Over the
next years, P&G was able to break the monopoly of Unilever on the British
soap and detergent market: whereas in 1930, Hedley held less than a 1%
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market share, In 1938 it held a 15% market share. Following World War II,
P*yG was able to increase its market shares both in the United States and in
the United Kingdom at the expense of Unilever.
The public record suggests that "exchange-of-threat" was a factor in the
motivation behind a third case, the initial entry into the United States in
1962 of the French firm Pechiney, then the World's fifth largest integrated
33
aluminum firm. It is interesting to note that although the early press
reports cited "preventive pressure" on U.S. rivals who were expanding In
Europe as the ma^or reason for Pechtney's entry into the United States,
press reports dealing with Pechiney's expansion of its United States opera-
tions a few years later fail to mention "exchange-of-threat" as a motivating
34
factor. Thus, the cases of Pechiney in the United States, Proctor and
Gamble in Great Britain, and Royal Dutch/Shell in the United States seem to
have at least two points in common: initial entry into the foreign market
was motivated (at least in large part) by "exchange-of-threat" considerations,
but later decisions to expand operations were motivated by different factors.
That the initial decision to make a foreign investment can be motivated by
quite different factors than later decisions to expand the reHultln^ operations
Is a rinding of a number of studies of the foreign Investment decision process,
35
and these three cases seem to Illustrate the point nicely.
A handful of cases may illustrate that "exchange-of-threat" may have
some validity for explaining specific examples of cross-investment, but the
question remains as to whether or onot the concept has any general validity.
The next section takes this question up.
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"Exchange-of-Threat: " Does It Explain Cross-Investment Between the United
States and Western Europe In the Post-World War II Era ?
The above question is at best a difficult one to answer. One
possible approach would bt to go directly to the companies involved
and ask them. Two methodological problems present themselves with this
approach. First, companies in general are not particularly open to
efforts to gain information about the motivation behind their major
international investments. Second, even if access to corporate information
could be gained, it might be difficult to ascertain which of the often
many stated motivations behind an investment are the primary ones.
Furthermore, as was noted in the previous section, the raison d '^tre of
a foreign subsidiary might change with time, and information gained today
might not accurately reflect the thinking behind investment moves made
in the past.
A second approach would be to examine the behavior of firms engaged
in transatlantic investment and to attempt to infer motivation from
this observation. In doing so, one always runs the risk that one's
inferences are wrong. Nonetheless, this indirect approach is the one which
was attempted by this researcher, mostly on the grounds that it was more
practical than the direct one. In particularly, the cross investment
behavior of a sample of large United States-based and European-based
multinational enterprises is examined. Included in the sample are 187
U.S. and 88 European firms on which extensive data were collected by
researchers at the Harvard Business School between the years 1965 and
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1972. The data collected include information on the more than 28,000
36
"foreign" subsidiaries of these (and other) firms.
To be included in the sample, the United States-based firms met
three criteria:
1. Each appeared on either the 1963 or 1964 Fortune list of the
"500 Largest U.S. Industrial Corporations:"
2. By the end of 1963 each firm held or had held a 25% or greater
equity interest in manufacturing firms located in 6 or more nations
outside of the United States; and
3. No firm was a subsidiary of some other firm.
Each Europe-based enterprise in the sample held or had held by 1970
at least one manufacturing subsidiary in the United States. In addition,
each appeared on Fortune's list of the "200 Largest Industrial Corporations'
for the year 1970 or had sales as great as firms which did appear on the
list but for some reason was itself excluded.
The Harvard researchers believe that the 187 U.S. firms account for
the bulk of U.S. direct investment in Europe and the 88 European firms
the bulk of European direct investment in the United States. Exactly
how much of the total of direct investment is in the hands of these firms
is not known because financial data on the subsidiaries is not available,
but an educated guess would be that the 187 U.S. firms hold at least 70%
of all U.S. direct investment in Europe and the 88 European firms at
least 80% of all European direct investment in the United States.
Table 1 indicates a distribution by industry grouping of the U.S.
subsidiaries of the 88 European-based multinational enterprises and the
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European subsidiaries of the 187 United States-based multinational
enterprises. Two characteristics stand out from the table. First,
the European subsidiaries per U.S. parent firm vastly outnumber the
U.S. subsidiaries per European parent firm. This is due doubtlessly
in part to the fact that the total value of direct investment in Europe
by U.S. corporations is vastly greater than the value of European
37
corporations' direct investment in the United States. It may also be
due to the fact that for a U.S. -based firm to create an integrated European
operation it must incorporate legal subsidiaries in each of the countries
in which it is to operate, while for a European-based firm to create an
integrated U.S. operation it need create but one legal subsidiary in
but one state of the Union.
A second characteristic is the industry by industry correlation bet-
ween the European susidiaries and the U.S. subsidiaries. An ordinary
least squares regression using "European Subsidiaries of U.S. Multinationals"
as one variable and "U.S. Subsidiaries of European Multinationals" as a
38
second yields a beta (Pearson) coefficient of 0.715. Thus, in fact, direct
investment by European multinationals in the United States does tend to
occur mostly in those industries in which U.S. multinationals invest
heavily in Europe. The industry by industry correlation is by itself
somewhat suggestive that the cross-investment might be induced by "exchange-
of-threat", although alternative hypotheses can be formulated to explain
the correlation.
Let us assume, however, for a moment that at least some of the
cross-investment among firms in the sample is indeed induced by "exchanee-
of-threat". Let us further assume that in most industries it is a U.S.
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Table 1: European Subsidiaries of 187 Multinational Enterprises
based in the United States and U.S. Subsidiaries of
88 Multinational Enterprises based in Europe by Industry
Note: The Table includes only those subsidiaries of Europeat^ corporations
formed from 1950 to 1970 and subsidiaries of U.S. corporations formed
from 1950 to 1967.
Industry clasi
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firm (or firms) that initiates the exchange by making a direct investment
somewhere in Europe and this causes some European firm (or firms) to
react by making a direct investment in the United States. This second
assumption is empirically justifiable. In most industries, flows of
U.S. direct investment into Europe have preceded any significant Europeans
direct investment into the United States.
Under these assumptions, it is clear that European direct investment
in the United States must lag U.S. direct investment in Europe. For the
i European firm, investment in the United States in the j industry in
the year t would be triggered by direct investment by U.S. firms in that
industry in the European firm's home market in years prior to t. Thus, for
industry j
,
I, = i: F B. I, ^ + U (1)i,t k,m k,t-m l,t
where I . is a direct investment in year t
' in the United States by European
firm i
I, is a direct investment in year L-m
' in the European home market of firm 1
by U.S. firm k
B, is a coefficient which is either positivekm
' in value or zero reflecting the prior
probability that firm i will react to
film k after a lag of m years
U. is an error term
1 »
t
If we asume that B, is independent of the value of k, which
k,m
would be true if the European firm reacts identically to direct investment
on Its soil by any U.S. firm or combination of firms, then B, = B
for all k and equation (1) can be rewritten as
II, t - j: B ); I, ^ -U. ^ (2)m m k k, t-m 1 ,
t
which is a distributed lag equation.
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This would suggest that if "exchange-of-threat" is a valid
explanation of cross investment, some distributed lag between U.S.
direct investment in Europe in a particular industry and European
direct investment in the United States would exist. The existence
(or nonexistence) of such a distributed lag would be a test of the
"exchange-of-threat" hypothesis. Although the existence of the lagged
relationship would not necessarily confirm the hypothesis, nonexistence
probably would lead one to reject it.
A priori it is difficult or impossible to specify by means of
theoretical reasoning the exact form of the relationship implied by
equation (2). The relationship is complicated by the fact that the
B might, for certain m, be zero. In particular, if there is a lead
m
time between the decision of firm i to respond to firms k and the
actual making of an investment, Bm might be zero for m < n, where n is
the lead time in years; furthermore in attempting to decide whether or
not to react to firm k, firm i might adopt a "wait and see" attitude
before making its move. Thus, the lead time might be highly unpredictable.
Also, the lead time is likely to be industry dependent.
Likewise, working from the available empirical data, it is difficult
39
to specify a model which "fits" the data. The author (who Is not an
econmetrlcian either by training or by inclination) did attempt a few
simple models, the simplest of which was to examine the relationship.
Y, = B. X, + U,
^
(3)
l,t i,t-m i,t-m i,t-m
where Y^
^
is the number of manufacturing subsidiaries
of the 88 European multinationals established (or
acquired) in the United States in industry i
in year t
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X.
^_^
is the number of manufacturing
subsidiaries of the 187 U.S.
multinationals established in
Europe in industry i in year
t-m
Table 2 indicates the beta coefficients calculated from equation
(3) for yeais t = 1950 to 1970, lag times m = years td H years and
industries i classified by two digit SIC code. Statistically significant
beta coefficients are found over a range of lag times for several industry
groupings, notably food products, chemical products, petroleum refining,
primary metals, fabricated metals, nonelectrical machinery, electrical
machinery, transportation, and instruments.
It can be shown that there exists a statistically significant positive
relationship between the maximum value of the beta coefficient (from Table 2)
for each industry grouping and measures of seller concentration and product
AO
differentiation for each industry. The former relationship is consistent
with the "exchange-of-threat" hypothesis but the latter is not. This
result is not surprising. It can be shown that there is a positive correla-
tion between those industries in which there is a propensity for direct
foreign investment by United States firms to occur and those which are
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marked by a high ratio of research and development to value added.
These latter industries in turn are characterized by a high rate of new
product introduction, and hence by a high degree of product differentiation.
In at least two such industries, the chemical and Integrated aluminum
industries, there exists a wide range of products which are sold In bulk
quantities and others of which are highly specialized and sold In limited
quantities. My observation has been that most of European direct investment
in these industries has been in plants to manufacture in bulk quantities,
but I do not know if this observation can be extended to other industries.
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These statistical results do suggest that in some industry groupings
European direct investment in the United States has lagged U.S. direct
investment in Europe in some systematic fashion. Importantly, the
parameters of the lagged relationship vary from industry to industry,
indicating that the lag is unlikely to be a function of some general
economic variable (such as interest rate differntial, exchange rate
risk, or the like) . From the data I cannot demonstrate exactly what the
lagged relationship is, and given the apparent differences in the relation-
ship industry to industry, to attempt to specify the relationshp might be
quite a fruitless undertaking.
An obiection to the "exchange-of-threat" hypothesis is contained in the
information presented in Table 2, This Is that the indicated lag times between
the U.S. investment in Europe and the hypothetical response of the Europeans is
too great (for most industries) to be the lead times between perception of a
threat and a response to it. The long lag times could be accounted for by the
time needed for European firms to overcome barriers to entry to the United States
market. If so, the question arises as to whether the lags indicated in Table 2
are accounted for by barriers to entry only, or are the lags accounted for by
both barriers to entry and by "exchange-of-threat"? From the data, one cannot
tel 1 .
Another valid objection to the results presented herein might be that
the industry groupings used to construct Table 2 are quite aggregated.
Because of the rather small total of subsidiaries of the 88 European
multinational enterprises, it is difficult to work with data disaggregated
much beyond the two digit SIC level of industrial classification.
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The statistical results are generally consistent with the hypothesis
that at least some direct investment in the United States occurs as a
result of "exchange-of-threat" , although the results fall well short of
being totally convincing. Based on my own probings into the statistics
(buttressed somewhat by a limited number of of f-the-record interviews with
executives of European firms which have made direct investments in the
United States), I am personally convinced that defensive considerations
such as "exchange-of-threat" do bear upon at least some recent decisions by
European firms to invest directly in the United States. T would conclude
that this factor is often overlooked In efforts to explain the observable
increase in European direct Investment In this country, and that at the
least further investigation would be indicated.
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